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State. A State party
can appoint an ad
hoc judge if no judge of its nationality sits among the
permanent judges. In accordance with the ICJ Statute, judges,
either permanent or ad hoc, shall exercise their powers
impartially. But in reality, can this expectation be achieved?
One of the most systematic empirical researches to address
this topic was done by Posner and de Figueiredo who studied
the ICJ cases from 1946 to 2004. Inspired by their research,
in our recent paper, “An Empirical Study of the Voting
Pattern of Judges of the International Court of Justice (2005-
2016)”, we have conducted a continued study on the ICJ cases
between 2005 and 2016. The raw data of this study can be
accessed at ResearchGate.
Our null hypothesis is that the voting pattern of the ICJ judges
is unbiased. Assuming that the null hypothesis is true,
decisions made by the ICJ judges are influenced only by
relevant legal considerations regardless of whether the
applicant or respondent is the judge’s home State or
appointing State (if yes, “party State”; and otherwise,














a particular case shares the same or similar political,
economic or cultural levels with the judge’s home State or
appointing State. We use the variables democracy, wealth
and language to respectively illustrate or measure the
political, economic or cultural levels of relevant States. As to
methodology, we use two methods: the difference tool and the
regression tool.
On the basis of the data collected, we found that nonparty
judges vote for applicants or respondents about 50% of the
time. In contrast, party judges vote for applicants that appoint
them about 88% of the time, and vote for respondents that
appoint them about 89% of the time. Hence, the probability of
a judge voting in favour of the applicant/respondent increases
significantly when the applicant/respondent State appoints
the judge. As a result, there is substantial evidence that party
judges of the ICJ vote in favour of their home States or
appointing States. Furthermore, by running several
regressions, we found strong evidence that ICJ judges favour
applicants that appoint them and that judges favour
respondents that speak the same majority languages as their
States, and weaker evidence that judges favour respondents
that appoint them, and more weakly or no evidence that
judges favour applicants that speak the same majority
languages as their States or that judges are influenced by
democracy and wealth alignments. These results suggest that
political and cultural factors do play a role in influencing the
votes of the ICJ judges.
Notably, our results are not exactly the same as those of
Posner and de Figueiredo’s, especially with regard to the
influence exerted by the democracy and wealth alignments.
These two variables were significant in cases between 1946
and 2004, but no longer in cases between 2005 and 2016. The
diluted influence exerted by the democracy and wealth
alignments on the judges’ voting pattern may not be an
isolated or surprising event, considering that the world has
experienced significant changes around the time of the
Millennium, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
end of the cold war, the emergence of a multi-polar world
economy, globalisation and so on. By contrast, the variable
language alignment remains significant in the current
research. This may in part confirm Samuel P. Huntington’s
prediction in his classic work, The Clash of Civilizations and
the Remaking of World Order, that “the great divisions
among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will
be cultural”. Nevertheless, to avoid doubt, this research has
not indicated that judges are consciously biased. Neither does
it suggest that the biased voting pattern of the ICJ judges will
necessarily lead to unfair interpretation or application of law.
All it has shown is that their voting pattern is not in line with
the manners described by the null hypothesis. 
